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FREEDOM OF SPEECH AS A RIGHT TO KNOW
Tao Huang

I. INTRODUCTION: CURRENT THEORY AND ITS DISCONTENTS

As one of the oldest and mostly acknowledged 1 constitutional
rights, freedom of speech is conventionally viewed as freedom to
express oneself and communicate with others without the interference
from the state. Its basic logic lies in an Enlightenment-era creed—the
belief that the ability to express or speak is inherent in every individual
and that everyone will be better-off by being more fully informed. It
does not mandate information to be provided, platforms to be
established, or interlocutors to be educated, at least according the
traditional doctrines. Free speech is a liberal right, and liberalism is
confident in each individual’s capacity to acquire, handle, exchange,
and judge the information she needs in communicative conducts.
The right to know, or the freedom of information, 2 is a much
younger right. Compared to the history of hundreds of years of free
speech, the right to know can only be dated back to half a century ago.
It was born in the transformative years in the Twentieth Century as a
response to the expansion of government powers and the rise of the
administrative state. In contrast to the freedom of speech, the right to
know enables more direct and positive control over information. By
granting the right of access to some government information produced
in its process of administration, the right to know facilitates democratic
participation and supervision of the citizens. The guiding principles
are popular sovereignty and government responsibility. It is a
modification of the romantic Enlightenment ideal that individuals are
better left alone even in the face of aggrandizing state powers.
The contrasts between the two rights are obvious. First, unlike the
negative, defensive and speaker-oriented freedom of speech, the right
to know is positive, offensive, and listener-oriented—it emphasizes the
citizen’s active capability to acquire information and the government’s
positive duty to disclose them. Second, rather than being a
fundamental human right, like the freedom of speech, the right to know
belongs more to the realm of administrative law. Even though some


S.J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law; LL.M., Harvard Law School. All comments
welcomed: tao.huang@duke.edu.
1. See David Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 773 (2012).
2. In many countries’ constitutions and laws, the right to know has been phrased as the freedom
of information.
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countries have enumerated the right to know in their constitutions, the
importance and the degree of protection it enjoys are generally less
than the older right of free speech. Third, partly because the right to
know enjoys relatively lower priority and serves particular ends, its
scope is much narrower than the freedom of speech. Normally, what
the citizen is entitled to know includes only the government
information that relates to the public interests, which is why this right
has intertwined and co-developed with the principle of open
government and the practice of government information disclosure.
Despite those differences, there are also connections between them.
As two rights that both treat information as their objects and regulate
the exchange of information, we can hardly say that they are totally
separate from each other. Since its birth, the right to know was based,
at least partly, on the basic tenets and values of the free speech. In
practice, some countries have prescribed both rights in their
constitutional texts. Some have treated the right to know as a
significant part of the expressive freedom, either in constitutional text
or through constitutional interpretation, while others have protected
the right to know through ordinary legislation, supplementing the
constitutional protection of the freedom of speech. 3 In any event,
freedom of speech is a major foundation of the institution of right to
know—scholarly literature admits as much.4 Because the freedom of
speech implicates the popular check of the government, a right to know
how the government operates necessarily follows.
However, deeper relationships between the right to know and the
freedom of speech remain underexplored. In particular, the issue of
whether and to what extent the old freedom of speech should be
reshaped by the new right to know has received little, if any, scholarly
focus. Just like the marketplace of goods and services, the marketplace
of ideas can also run into malfunction, or even paralysis. The threat to
free speech does not only come from the state. Effective exchange of
ideas requires not only inaction or neutrality of government: formal
equality of expressive freedom could lose much of its meaning due to
the disparity of wealth and power. Scholars have begun to revise the

3. See infra Section IV- A of this Article.
4. David M. O'Brien, The First Amendment and the Public's Right to Know, 7 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 579, 580 (1980) (“[a]n increasing number of constitutional scholars argue that the public's ‘right to
know’ is implicitly guaranteed by the First Amendment and by the general principles of a constitutional
democracy.”); Anthony Lewis, A Public Right to Know about Public Institutions: The First Amendment
as Sword, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2-3 (1980) (“If citizens are the ultimate sovereigns, as the Constitution
presupposes, they must have access to the information needed for intelligent decision.”). For general
reviews of this issue, see Barry Sullivan, FOIA and the First Amendment: Representative Democracy and
the People's Elusive Right to Know, 72 MD. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2012).
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traditional theories to respond to those challenges. 5 One of the
endeavors was to reformulate the theory of free speech through the
module of the right to know.
Nearly half a century ago, commentators posited that the freedom
of speech encompassed the basic tenets of the right to know,6 although
they refused to interpret it as a general and enforceable right. 7 The
most typical and radical proposition came from Alexander
Meiklejohn, who advocated that the right to know was the major, or
even the only, component of free speech. Meiklejohn argued that the
normative basis for protecting our freedom of expression was to ensure
the people participate in the process of self-government, and that the
constitution protects the freedom of speech exactly for the reason of
making certain that people are uninhibited in accessing the information
about their representatives and hold open discussions on them.8
However, another major advocate of the right to know, Thomas
Emerson, deemed that Meiklejohn’s proposal had gone too far.9 His
reasons were, first, that a freedom of speech based primarily on the
right to know, primarily protects the listeners, while leaving the
speakers under-protected. Second, the Constitution could provide
absolute protection to free speech, while it is hard to provide a similar
degree of protection to the right to know. Finally, speakers are
normally more motivated to claim their rights, and through protecting
listeners directly and protecting speakers indirectly, the right to know
would decrease the overall strength of protection of free speech. 10
This article refutes the first and third points in the next Section of this
Article. The second point, which deals with the strength and scope of
the right, will be examined in Section four of this Article.
Meiklejohn and Emerson are not the only scholars that have touched
5. See, e.g., OWEN FISS,THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and
Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1 (2004).
6. See, e.g., Wallace Parks, Open Government Principle: Applying the Right to Know Under the
Constitution, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1957); O'Brien, supra note 4, at 579; David Mitchell Ivester, The
Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109 (1977).
7. See David M. O'Brien, Reassessing the First Amendment and the Public's Right to Know in
Constitutional Adjudication, 26 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1981); Sullivan, supra note 4, at 1).
8. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245
(1961); William Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment,
79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965).
9. Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 4-5
(1976).
10. Id. Emerson also proposed a fourth line of argument, i.e., the history, tradition, and practice
(of America) are based on the speaker’s right; so a listener-based right to know might break abruptly with
the past. But historical baggage alone cannot be our reason to refuse reform, and most countries in the
world have a history of free speech much shorter than the United States, thus carrying much light baggage
of history.
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on this topic. For example, Anthony Lewis, in response to fastgrowing agencies and bureaucracies, has proposed reinterpreting free
speech as a “sword” against the government, empowering the citizens
with information needed for checking the public power.11 Going one
step further, Michael Perry explicitly contended that the principle of
free expression should be “amplified” as including a right to know,
because “[a] refusal to disclose is simply a kind of interference with
access.”12
These attempts offered us new insights in rethinking and rebuilding
the relationships between freedom of speech and right to know;
However, they are inadequate. First, these scholars only gave
preliminary thoughts, rather than structured approaches, much less the
systematic designs of the new approaches. Second, the papers
mentioned above were written before the Internet Age, thus lacking
the consideration of the new challenges brought by information
technologies. These challenges are tremendous. For instance,
traditional theories of free speech focused more on speaking rather
than listening: in most circumstances, the constitution directly
protected speakers, not listeners.13 It is reasonable that speakers are
the major claimers of rights, but it becomes more and more arbitrary
to separate speakers and listeners nowadays. Sometimes speakers are
difficult to identify, as in the situation of anonymous speech that is
common in cyberspace. Sometimes an individual can have dual
identities as a speaker and a listener, as the Internet has made everyone
both content consumers and producers. Sometimes a speaker is not a
human being, as robots can express ideas too. At the same time, the
problem of multiple regulators and polarization in cyberspace has
challenged the values and practices of democratic participation, one of
the major normative bases of free speech.
This Article will start from the premises and proposals of the
scholars mentioned above. Through developing, modifying, and
supplementing their theories, as well as taking into account the new
speech conditions in the Internet Age, this Article aims to develop
11. Lewis, supra note 4, at 25.
12. Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 NW. U. L.
REV. 1137, 1194 (1983).
13. Emerson, supra note 9, at 5.(“[h]istory, tradition, doctrine, and practice have all developed
largely on the basis of protecting the rights of the speaker.”). There are some authors who think that the
freedom of speech protects mainly the listener’s rights, and the speaker’s rights are only incidentally
protected. See LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 8-9 (2005);
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 22-27 (1948); Robert
H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 25-26 (1971); Frederick
Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning, 2003 SUP. CT.
REV. 197, 216-24; Eugene Volokh, The Freedom of Speech and Bad Purposes, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1366,
1370-71 (2016).
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systematically, though not completely, the theoretical basis and
practical implications of the freedom of speech as a right to know. The
relationship between the two rights is not unidirectional: not only
could the freedom of speech form the basis for the right to know, but
also the right to know could enrich the doctrine of the freedom of
speech. The characteristics of the right to know could make the
freedom of speech more direct, more practical, and more enforceable.
We should accordingly interpret the freedom of speech as a right to
know. This Article’s thesis does not necessarily require the right to
know to be expressly written into the Constitution (although this is one
reasonable approach), nor does it contend that freedom of speech is the
only basis for the right to know. Rather, this Article reformulates the
theory of free speech through the module of the right to know. Having
done that, the right to know will, in effect, be constitutionalized
because it will become a part of the freedom of speech. What’s more
important is the impact on our current free speech jurisprudence: using
information as both a shield and a sword, this new and reformulated
right will better respond to the age we are in where speech is
information, information is power, and the liberty of speech is the
freedom and control of information.
This Article proceeds as three parts: Why, What, and How. Part II
of this article will demonstrate why the freedom of speech, especially
in the context of the Internet Age, should be reformulated as the right
to know, or the freedom of information. On the one hand, expression
presupposes the possession of information, and the right to know
actually serves both the interest of the listener and that of the speaker.
On the other hand, freedom of speech needs the positive element to
know in this age, when more delicate surveillance and control
facilitated by information technology has made individuals much more
vulnerable, and the multi-polar structure of regulations—especially the
authority of censorship by Internet intermediaries—has shaken the
foundation of our traditional constitutional values, such as
transparency, due process, and responsibility. In this scenario, to
“empower” the freedom of speech by the right to know means to
empower the individuals against the gradual and invisible
encroachment by the state and the intermediaries. Democratic
participation and supervision constitute the shared basis for the
freedom of speech and the right to know. Through the acquisition of
more information, citizens become more capable to express
themselves in the public sphere, and the public opinion thus formed
acts as an important check to the governments.
If the previous argument stands, the natural next question would be:
what is the difference between this new freedom of speech as a right
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to know and the traditional freedom? What is the implication for such
reformulation? Part III tries to answer these questions. In theory, this
reformulation will clarify the currently ambiguous role of listeners in
traditional theories and put an end to the outdated debate of whether
free speech is a negative or positive liberty. In addition to the
“enrichment” of the normative theories of free speech, the
reformulation can also help resolve many practical issues in the field,
facilitating the development of free speech adjudications and
institutions. First, the issue of subject will be solved once and for all,
since in the right to know analysis, whether certain kinds of speech are
produced by corporations, organizations, or even robots becomes
unimportant.
Second, specific categories of speech, such as
commercial speech and professional speech, are highly controversial
in traditional approaches. The right to know perspective provides a
clearer and better framework in understanding whether and how these
kinds of speech should be protected. Third, defining the freedom of
speech as the acquisition and keeping of information propels us to go
beyond the dichotomous mode of analysis and broaden our perspective
to view free expression as a system. This will also change our method
of interpreting and applying the constitution, by moving from the
narrow notion of formal liberty to the systematic balance of the formal
and the substantive.
Part IV will discuss how to implement this reformulated freedom in
practice: an issue of institutional design. After comparing different
modes of tackling the two rights in the national constitutions, I will
divide the issue into various subcategories and offer my tentative
proposals. Among other issues, the scope and strength of information
disclosure should capture our top priority. To be sure, as a preliminary
attempt of reshaping the freedom of speech through the right to know,
this paper cannot be flawless. Part V lists several possible criticisms
this approach and offers brief responses to them. These responses are
also preliminary. What I hope is that my endeavor in this paper could
provoke more in-depth discussions among readers.
II. WHY: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
A. Right to Know is the Basis of Freedom of Speech

First and foremost, it is common sense that the acquisition and
comprehension of information constitutes the basis of expression.
Expression is the transmission and exchange of information. For any
expression to be effective, two conditions must be present: the
speakers have something to express, and the listeners can understand
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what the speakers have expressed. It is not necessary that what the
listeners understand should be exactly the same as what the speakers
have had in mind; but the listeners must comprehend, at least partly,
what the speakers mean in the specific contexts. The first condition
requires the exporter (speaker) to possess some information as her
background material for output. Similarly, the second condition
requires the receiver (listener) to possess at least enough information
in order to understand what the speaker says. Otherwise the
conversation would become cross-talk at best and meaningless at
worst. All expressions, whatever forms they take (verbal, visual,
behavioral, etc.) are contextual. Thus, effective communications
presume the sharing of particular information between the two parties.
Without the condition “to know,” the expressive conduct itself would
lose much of its essence, let alone realizing the meaning of free
expression.14
Second, to know is not only the factual basis but also the normative
basis of expression. The search for truth, the participation in
democratic self-government, and self-realization 15 all rely on the
possession of information. If information is blocked, suppressed, or
distorted, the hope of the truth being triumphantly sifted out in the
marketplace would be dimmer, the development of the human capacity
would be hindered, and democratic participation would also be an
illusion.16 Among the several values, the argument from democracy is
the most important common denominator between freedom of speech
and right to know, 17 and the major justification for the latter to be
institutionalized or constitutionalized.18 Freedom of speech and right

14. Thus, Justice Thurgood Marshall of the U. S. Supreme Court has analogized the freedom to
speak and the freedom to listen as the two sides of the same coin. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
775 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The freedom to speak and the freedom to hear are inseparable; they
are two sides of the same coin.”).
15. These are the three normative values that are mostly acknowledged by the commentators. See
FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech
Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1989).
16. Emerson, supra note 9, at 2 (arguing that the right to know and the freedom of speech serve
the same normative values.)
17. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 9 (demonstrating that the right to know serves two democratic
functions: government accountability and citizen participation.); Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights
for the Right to Know, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1199, 1204 (1962) (arguing that in the United States, the
advocates of the right to know have grounded it upon the constitutional bases of freedom of speech and
of the press, the aim of which is to promote the democratic check on the government.)
18. Emerson, supra note 9, at 16. (“One would seem to be on solid ground, therefore, in asserting
a constitutional right in the public to obtain information from government sources necessary or proper for
the citizen to perform his function as ultimate sovereign.”)；David C. Vladeck, Information Access Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of Federal Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1787-78
(2008) (surveying a series of laws of the United States that protects the right to know, such as the FOIA,
and pointing out that the rationale behind them is the notion that information is the life of democracy.)
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to know are both instrumental rights and supplementary rights. They
are instrumental in the sense that without an informed citizenry and a
corresponding open public debate, democratic participation and
supervision would be impossible. The two rights, like two sides of the
same coin, serve the value of democracy and ensure the sovereign role
of the people.19 As Michael Perry remarked, “government denial of
access to protected information . . . subverts the ideal of a
knowledgeable citizenry, a well-informed electorate, without which
democracy is a sham.”20 They are also supplemental in the sense that,
on the one hand, the two rights provide remedies to the innate flaws of
representative democracy: how to make the government responsible
for the people in the interim of elections. Freedom of speech and right
to know facilitates the popular participation in politics in daily lives—
though some or most citizens might lack the willingness to participate,
they at least obtain such an option—giving them the power beyond
ballots. On the other hand, the deliberative process that is safeguarded
by the two rights is also the major source of political legitimacy in
modern societies. Habermas, for example, argued that communicative
actions that aim for cooperative undertakings serve as the legitimate
basis for politics in an age of plurality, and such communicative
actions must be equal, inclusive, and free of coercion and distortion.21
A presumption of this argument is the free flow and equal sharing of
information —at least the information which is important to the
political community. Thereby, freedom of speech as a right to know
justifies the existence and continuance of modern polities.
Third, a right to know serves both the speaker and the listener. At
first glance, the subject of the right to know is the listener and the
speaker is only relevant for fulfilling her duty of disclosing the
requested information. The right of the speaker to express seems
derivative or secondary to the right of the listener to know. In fact, the
former could be protected through the protection of the latter. No more
and no less. If a listener wants to hear, the freedom of the speaker to
express could be protected through the protection of the listener’s right
to know. That means the disclosure and expression of such information
cannot be banned without legitimate and adequate reasons. Only
information which no one in the world wants to hear, or no one in the
world could understand, would fall outside of this protection. A speech
without audience cannot serve any normative values underlying the
19. See Meiklejohn, supra note 13; Meiklejohn, supra note 8.
20. Perry, supra note 12, at 1195.
21. The opposing concept of communicative action is strategic action; for their meanings,
distinctions, and the implications for political legitimacy, see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1984).
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free speech principle. Of course, one talking to herself is protected by
the Constitution and the law—even when no one hears or no one
understands. But here the protection is afforded by the general
freedom, rather than the specific freedom of speech.
One line of argument that Emerson raised in refuting Meiklejohn’s
proposal was that the right to know, as a listener-oriented right, ignores
the interests of self-fulfillment of the speaker. 22 Randall Bezanson
expressed a similar concern when he stated that “a speaker-based
approach provides a degree of conceptual clarity and perhaps even
simplicity in the structure of First Amendment doctrine.”23 Both were
worried about diluted protection of speakers from an audience’s
perspective. The analysis here proves that the self-fulfillment interest
of the speaker could be protected by either the right to know of the
listener (in the case of where there is audience) or the general freedom
(in the case of soliloquy). As for who claims the rights, the right to
know does not deprive the speaker’s privilege to claim her right, and
through institutional design, the speaker can claim her free speech right
through her audience’s right to know.
B. The Right To Know is More Urgently Needed in the Information Age

The danger of polarization looms large—much larger—in the era of
big data and artificial intelligence. As the Silicon Valley saying goes,
data is the new oil.24 Data has become the most important resource
and source of wealth in this age. 25 Whoever controls data wields
power. Because data is produced by us but does not belong to us, it is
much easier for a small group of technology and business elites who
“own”, processes, and make use of the big data to amass tremendous
power—winner takes all! The digital divide will naturally produce and
exacerbate the class divide. New information technologies have
accelerated this process. At first sight, Constitutional scholars should
celebrate these technologies. As the media of expression have
migrated from streets and parks to mass media and now to cyberspace,
we’ve witnessed the burgeoning of expressive channels, the reduction
of expressive costs, and the expansion of expressive scope. Indeed,
many scholars have cheered this revolution of democratic participation

22. See supra notes 10-11 and the accompanying text.
23. Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 741 (1995).
24. Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and
New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1154 (2018).
25. Id. at 1158 (“We tend to associate power with the effects of technology itself. But technology
is actually a way of exemplifying and constituting relationships of power between one set of human beings
and another set of human beings.”)
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and cultural innovation brought by the Internet. 26 However, the
situation of most individuals—normal persons without much wealth or
power—has not changed substantially. Information explosion has
made attention, rather than information itself, the scarce resource.27
More channels of expression and broader scope of communication in
theory do not mean they are equally effective in practice: what matters
is the influence. Everyone can speak, but only those minority speakers
(such as the giant Internet intermediaries controlled by the state or
businesses) can catch our attention. Louis Seidman has made a critical
and illuminating remark:
One might suppose that this democratization of speech breaks the link
between wealth and speech opportunities. In fact, though, the change
exacerbates, rather than diminishes, the difficulty for progressives. In a
world where there is too much speech, the old notion that a free speech
regime creates an unfettered marketplace of ideas breaks down. Anyone
can use Twitter, but that very fact means that Twitter produces an
undifferentiated and useless swamp of information and opinion. The result
is that people need a filter. Real control is therefore exercised not by
speech producers but by speech aggregators and amplifiers, who
themselves enjoy some protection under the First Amendment. While it
may be cheap to produce speech, aggregation and amplification—speech
management—still require capital. Moreover, the managers regularly
shield speech consumers from ideas that are unfamiliar, upsetting, or
inconsistent with a preconceived narrative. To the extent that progressive
views are all of these things, they are regularly filtered out by technological
devices that allow people to receive only the ideas that they want to hear.28

Information explosion makes filtration inevitable. Ad hoc filtration
that adapts to specific contexts is too costly to be universally applied.
Hence, centralized and general filtration became the only alternative.
The task of computing and processing huge amounts of data is so
formidable that only the government and giant corporations with
enough human and financial resources can handle it. The technology
and necessity of filtration not only greatly enhances the powers of the
government and corporations, but also threatens the freedom of
expression and the flow of information in our public sphere.29
Furthermore, the multipolar structure of regulations has made
individuals more vulnerable. Unlike the bipolar structure (state as
regulator vs. regulatees) in the pre-Internet era, scholars have acutely
26. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006).
27. Balkin, supra note 5, at 7.
28. Louis M. Seidman, Can Free Speech be Progressive, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2219, 2235
(2018)(footnotes omitted.)
29. Katia Bodard, Free Access to Information Challenges by Filtering Techniques, 12 INFO. &
COMM. TECH. L. 263 (2003).
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observed the tri-polar phenomenon on the Internet: state,
intermediaries, and regulatees.30 Intermediaries like Internet Service
Providers, search engines, and social media, have gained regulatory
power no less salient than the state. Individual regulatees are now
facing double threats from both the state and intermediaries—and the
two often cooperate. This kind of “new-school regulation” is more
invisible, more effective, and more delicate.31 The regulatory power
wielded by intermediaries has posed significant challenges to our
traditional constitutional values. This kind of private censorship runs
without the limits of due process, democratic accountability,
transparency, and is more prone to over-censor or manipulate.32 In
confronting the powerful intermediaries, individuals need more than
formal freedom from interference to truly realize their liberty to
express. To require the intermediaries to disclose and share their data
can not only alleviate the risks of lack of transparency and due process,
but also check their use of power, striking a balance between the
freedoms of different parties in the structure. In other words, the right
to know is a shield and sword against both the state and the private
intermediaries.
In the Information Age, everything is information: everything can
be digitalized. The internet has become the most important public
forum. It has replaced newspapers, radios, and television, and
constitutes the biggest platform for citizens to acquire information,
exchange opinions, and participate in public life.
But the
characteristics of the Internet are not all hospitable to democratic
values. In addition to the control and polarization brought by
information overflow, anonymity makes online speech much less
reliable and responsible. The echo chamber effect facilitates the spread
of extreme views. The “personalization” based on big data can
reinforce the current biases and make the process of consensusbuilding much harder.33
In this context, values are in struggle: freedom vs. control;
democracy vs. authority; and equality vs. polarization. What values
technology will promote depends on the choice of the individual.34
30. Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011 (2018).
31. Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296 (2014);
Balkin, supra note 24.
32. Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the
Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 27-33 (2006).
33. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
(2017). For an account of the Internet’s influence on the general constitutional jurisprudence, see Mark
Tushnet, Internet Exceptionalism: An Overview from General Constitutional Law, 56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1637 (2014-2015).
34. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT (2008).
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And how we shape and treat the freedom of speech and the right to
know will determine whether the choice will be made by sheer power
and capital or by each individual citizen. “There is no such thing as a
free speech,” 35 because the freedom to speak is not free. For any
formal and theoretical freedom to be realized, words on parchment are
not enough. Rather, some conditions and resources are needed. The
chief purpose of speech is to communicate, and to influence others
through such communication. Whether, where, and to what extent this
influence could be effective depends primarily on the material and
cultural resources that the speaker owns. In this sense, government’s
protection and promotion of free speech will unavoidably relate to its
general distributive program of resources. Fortunately, money is not
the only factor here. Other factors, such as persuasive force,
reputation, control of information, also determine the practical effects
of free expression.36 The right to know entitles citizens the right to
request, possess, and use information. To endow such a right to
citizens as a basic constitutional right can be seen as a measure by the
state to redistribute information—an important kind of resource, and a
legitimate means of remedy, targeting the failures of the marketplace
of ideas and the inequality caused by the disparity of informational
resources in this age.37
As the right to know can empower individuals to withstand the state
and intermediaries, why not prescribe it directly, rather than by
reformulating the freedom of speech? Apart from the similar content
and common normative ground between the two rights, the power of
intermediaries derives not only from their ownership of the data, but
also from the freedom of speech they enjoy. Intermediaries can be
speakers too. Many intermediaries, like Google, have resisted
government regulations by claiming that their algorithmic output
constitutes speech protected by the First Amendment.38 Thus, they are
both the subject of private rights (of free speech) and public power (of
regulating speech). On the one hand, a statutory right to know by
35. Eric Neisser, Charging for Free Speech: User Fees and Insurance in the Marketplace of Ideas,
74 GEO. L. J. 257, 258 (1985).
36. See Frederick Schauer, The Political Incidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. COLO. L.
REV. 935, 949 (1993).
37. For research on to what extent free speech can alleviate the problems of polarization and
alienation, and promote equality or fairness, see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider
in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1258 (1991-1992) (arguing that freedom of speech can hardly mitigate the inequality in fields of race and
gender) ； Cf. Jedediah Purdy, Beyond the Bosses’ Constitution: The First Amendment and Class
Entrenchment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2161 (2018) (maintaining that freedom of speech could and should
promote equality).
38. See EUGENE VOLOKH & DONALD M. FALK, FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR SEARCH
ENGINE SEARCH RESULTS (Commissioned by Google 2012)
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ordinary legislation is not enough, because it cannot trump the
constitutional right of free speech enjoyed by the intermediaries (as
speakers). On the other hand, the approach of reformulating freedom
of speech as a right to know does not deny the plausibility of another
approach, which puts the right to know directly in the Constitution.
Although the right to know serves multiple constitutional values,39 it
shares one key value with free speech: democratic participation and
supervision. This Article’s proposed approach stresses that by
incorporating the right to know into freedom of speech, we can clarify
and highlight the positive and obligatory elements inherent in the
freedom of speech—avoiding abuse by intermediaries.
III. WHAT: CROSS-FERTILIZATION BETWEEN THE TWO RIGHTS

What’s the difference between the freedom of speech as a right to
know and the traditional right of freedom of speech? What changes
will the reformulated right bring about? As this Part discusses, such a
reformulation has at least the following implications—all of which
should be embraced.
First, the right to know makes visible the long-invisible role of the
listener in traditional free speech jurisprudence. In most typical cases,
the issue of dispute is that the speaker’s expression was prohibited or
limited by the government regulation and the interests to be balanced
are normally the freedom of speech of the speaker versus the alleged
government interests, such as national security or social order. In this
analysis, the listeners—who are they, what are their interests, and how
to protect them—have received little attention. In theory and judicial
practice of many countries, the protection of listeners was realized
through the protection of the speakers. This is generally reasonable
because the speakers are fixed in numbers and scope, more easily
identifiable, and more easily targeted by government regulation. They
are also more willing and able to vindicate their rights. By contrast,
the scope and number of listeners are often uncertain and fluid. They
are also difficult to identify and not the direct object of regulations.
Thus, focusing on the speakers has served as a workable way for
“delegating” the rights of the listeners to those of the speakers.40
However, sometimes the speakers might not choose to claim their

39. Freedom of speech is not the only constitutional basis for the right to know; other values are
salient here too: such as popular sovereignty, deliberative democracy, and government accountability.
40. Leslie Kendrick, Are Speech Rights for Speakers, 203 VA. L. REV. 1767, 1778 (2017)
(“Because the government often seeks to restrict speech by penalizing speakers, speakers are often best
placed to challenge allegedly censorial governmental action.”)
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right, or the right of the speaker and that of the listener may clash.41 A
direct right to know by the listeners would be necessary in these
circumstances. We should not forget that the normative values of
truth-seeking and democratic participation function mainly by the
involvement of the listeners. By empowering potential listeners with
a right to know, they can participate more directly and effectively in
the process of public debate and democratic self-governance. Through
this approach, the reformulated freedom of speech would now enjoy
broader protection (from the individual speaker to the large audience)
and grow stronger (from negative non-interference to positive request)
than the traditional freedom.
Second, reformulating the freedom of speech as a right to know can
help us get rid of the outdated and parochial notion of free speech as
merely a negative liberty, 42 and figure out a new path of positive
protection of the freedom of speech. Freedom is not free. The
realization of any freedom requires some material, cultural and social
conditions. The traditional theory is biased towards minimal
government. It is based on the classic liberalism in the early stages of
industrialization—trust in the market and distrust in the government.
In recent decades, this theory has come under fierce criticism: people
not only realize that the market may be wrong, but also realize that the
government can do good..43 Freedom framed only in the negative way
could stratify the marketplace and bias the entrenched interests of
incumbents—those who monopolized the expressive resources.
Understanding the limitations of the traditional approach and the
positive capacity of the freedom of speech is only the first step. We
need to find a plausible path for realizing the positive capacity. The
government, or other entities, can take many different positive
measures to promote citizens’ right to freedom of speech. For
example, facilitating more equal and more open media access,
providing better education, and bettering the material conditions of
marginalized groups. These measures all concern the redistribution of
public resources and might raise the question of whether they will
better be prescribed by the Constitution or reviewed by the legislature
through the political process. One less radical measure, which is not
41. Emerson, supra note 9, at 7 (The author summarized the reasons for acknowledging an
independent right to know as follows: the interest of the listener may be different than the interest of the
speaker; the speaker may not claim the right for the listener; the interest of the listener may be very
important that worth independent protection; and the right to know focus on the positive side of the free
speech, rather than mere non-interference.)
42. Frederick Schauer, Positive Rights, Negative Rights, and the Right to Know, in TROUBLING
TRANSPARENCY: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 34, 37-39 (David E. Pozen
& Michael Schudson eds., 2018).
43. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 5.
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that redistributive, is to incorporate the right to know into the freedom
of speech. Stipulating a positive duty of information disclosure in
required situations is what the constitution can, and should, do. True,
this approach is also redistributive, since the relevant institutions of
disclosure need financial support; but it is a much more moderate path.
It could become a starting point for us to reinvigorate the free speech
clause.
Third, the definition of freedom of speech as the right to know
solves the difficult problem of legal subjects. Whether certain
expression is protected does not depend on the subject of the
expression, whether it is an individual or a corporate body, and no
matter of whether it has legal standing. 44 Content, rather than the
subject, is the determinative factor.
This issue is particularly salient in the field of artificial intelligence
(“AI”). 45 Robots can express, just like humans. Consider search
engine rankings, news feeds, and auto-generated ads—they are all
“uttered” by robots. In the case of weak AI, one solution is to
categorize the expression of robots (algorithms) to that of the
developer (programmer). This approach is not perfect, since that the
developer is the author of the algorithm, but not necessarily the author
of the algorithmic output. In other words, a developer predefined the
purpose—the problem to be solved—by the program, but has stayed
away from the output process. When the program is intelligent, its
output is generated and produced automatically by its predefined
algorithm. The developer just sets the first step and waits for the work
to be finished by the algorithm. Her connection with the algorithmic
output is too indirect and weak to claim either a copyright46 or a free
speech right on the output. Otherwise there will be the risk of
overprotection. In the case of strong AI, the connection is even
weaker. Should we protect such subjectless expression? In my
proposed approach, if those algorithmic outputs are the object of
others’ legitimate right to know, they should be protected. This is not
to say that as long as someone wants to know something, that
something will always receive the protection of freedom of speech. To
want to know is just the first step. The expression must be something
that should be known. The information that claims protection must
serve the common normative basis of the freedom of speech and the
44. Eric G. Olsen, Note, Right to Know in First Amendment Analysis, 57 TEX. L. REV. 505, 515
(1979).
45. For excellent research on the issue of legal subjects with regard to artificial intelligence, see
Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231 (1992).
46. Robert Yu, Comment, The Machine Author: What Level of Copyright Protection is
Appropriate for Fully Independent Computer Generated Works, 165. U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1261 (2017).
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right to know—democratic participation. This means the information
must have public importance. This relates to the question of
institutional design (where information is the object of the right to
know) and will be explored in Section IV.
Fourth, the perspective of the right to know provides us additional
insights on some controversial issues in the area of free speech, such
as whether and how commercial and professional speech should be
protected. Current jurisprudence holds that commercial speech
receives no or very limited free speech protection.47 That’s because
commercial speech is intended to promote business transactions and to
increase profits. These aims are quite distinct from the normative
values underlying free speech. But the interest of the speaker
(producer or seller) is one thing; the interest of the listener (consumer)
is another. Commercial ads, even though produced for the very
purpose of financial profits, effectively serve the right to know of the
consumer. From the commercial propaganda, the consumer acquires
the information of the features of certain products and the state of
affairs of the market. Based on these kinds of information, she forms
expectations and plans her economic behaviors accordingly. A market
with vibrant flows of information and informed consumers is vital to
the stability of the economy and the society. This does not mean that
commercial speech enjoys free speech protection in all events or that
it enjoys the same degree of protection as other kinds of speech.
Suffice to say that any analysis of the value of commercial speech
should take into account the right to know of the consumers (the
general public). 48 Before we make hasty conclusions, an inquiry
should be made on whether some information with public importance
is contained in the commercial ads.
Professional speech, unlike commercial speech, is produced in
specific and highly technical contexts, such as the prescriptions of
doctors and the legal opinions of lawyers. Government regulations on
this kind of speech are ubiquitous. For example, certain qualifications
of licenses are mandatory before making such speech. Speech contrary
to professional ethics may be punished and specific information must
be disclosed to clients or the general public. Judging solely from the
standpoint of speakers, those regulations have infringed their freedom
of speech. But they are understandable from the angle of the right to
know of the listeners. Because of the special contexts the speech
involves, people hold special expectations about professional speech.
The reliability of professional speech can influence the trust people
47. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET. AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 171-182 (5th ed. 2016).
48. Eric G. Olsen, Note, Right to Know in First Amendment Analysis, 57 TEX. L. REV. 505, 51920 (1979).
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have in professions. The government has to make sure that
professional speech is true, accurate, reliable, and “in accordance with
the insights of the relevant knowledge community.” 49 Imagine the
societal consequences if a lawyer or a doctor can “freely” express
themselves, regardless of the limits of the professional rules and ethics.
Here, expression is restricted by the right to know. Professional
practitioners’ freedom of expression is restricted by the overall
knowledge structure of the profession on the one hand, and by the
general public’s legitimate requirements for accurate information on
the other. Therefore, unlike ordinary speech, professional speech
enjoys a different kind and degree of protection due to its special link
with the right to know.50
Fifth, redefining the freedom of speech as a right to know enables
us to take a holistic and systematic view in resolving concrete issues.
In the Internet Age, freedom of speech is more like a system51than a
simple dichotomy between the regulators and the regulatees. Focusing
on information, which is constantly in flow, rather than on the static
relationship between two communicating parties, broadens our
perspective on the freedom of speech. Jack Balkin has summarized
the free speech system as a triad structure.52 But it is more accurate to
describe it as a tetrad: in this terrain, the state and the intermediaries
(corporations) are regulators of speech (and they might be speakers in
some occasions too), while individual speakers and listeners are
regulatees. In addition, those who have neither spoken nor heard the
communications—the general public—should also be included in our
system. As third parties, their interests are also closely related to the
regulations of speech. On the one hand, they surely benefit from the
general environment of an open and free debate, and the well-being
that results from such debate, such as scientific progress or a more
responsible and transparent government. On the other hand, they also
bear the harm that results from a controlled, blocked, or distorted
public sphere. 53 It is for this reason that Thomas Scanlon has
concluded that the interests of free speech encompass the interest of
the speaker, the interest of the audience, and the interest of other
bystanders. Those of the latter two are more important.54
49. Claudia Haupt, The Limits of Professional Speech, 128 YALE. L. J. F. 185, 188 (2018).
50. Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status
of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 828-33 (1999).
51. See Yochai Benkler, Freedom in Systems, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 351 (2013-2014); Jeremy K.
Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment, 118 COLUM.A L. REV. 1953,
2001 (2018).
52. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
53. Kendrick, supra note 40, at 1777.
54. Thomas Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV.
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Intermediaries
(corporations)

State

Regulatees
(speakers + listeners)

General Public
(third parties)

In the system, the role of the right to know is to oversee the operation
of the regulators—state and some intermediaries that carry out
regulatory functions—and act as a corrective measure for the system.55
This systematic perspective prompts us to move beyond the narrow
notion of formal liberty to a synthesis of the formal and the substantive.
In interpreting and implementing the constitution, all the subjects,
including the regulators, the regulatees and third parties, should be
taken into consideration. The constitutionality of a law or an
administrative regulation is not judged only by determining on
whether it is formally neutral, but on whether it substantively protects
the rights of every subject in the system, and whether it has struck a
legitimate and reasonable balance between their respective interests.
Likewise, the promotion of freedom of speech should be based on the
influence on the whole system, rather than the interests of one or
several parties. A holistic mode of thinking is necessary in
administrative decision-making, judicial adjudication, and legislative
deliberation. The costs and benefits of the whole free speech system
must be taken into account.
IV. HOW: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
A. Current Approaches

Though scholars have debated the relationship between the right to
know and the freedom of speech, the constitutions and judicial
practices of many countries have acknowledged that the right to know
519, 520 (1979).
55. Thomas I. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 8 (1976)
(“A major current problem in maintaining our system of freedom of expression is that various economic
and technical factors tend to distort the system. Like most laissez-faire arrangements, the free market of
ideas does not work perfectly. Consequently, it is necessary for the government to step in at times in order
to regulate or expand the system. Such action is frequently taken in the name of the right to know.”)
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is an important part of the freedom of speech.56 First, in international
treaties and conventions, the two rights are generally contained in one
clause, and their close ties are clearly stipulated.57 Article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states “[e]veryone has the
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom
to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers.” 58 Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights states that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom
of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other
media of his choice.” 59 Similarly, Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights states “[e]veryone has the right to
freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.”60
Second, many constitutions of various nations include both the
freedom of speech (or freedom of expression) and the right to know
(or freedom of information). The majority of these constitutions put
the two rights in one single article, and some even state that the
freedom of speech encompasses the right to know. This approach
corresponds with my argument in this Article. There are at least fortythree countries that have adopted this approach.61 Thirteen countries
56. Tim Chi Hang Yu, Constitutionality of the Code on Access to Information, 43 HONG KONG L.
J. 189, 192 (2013) (“While there may be differing views on the validity of incorporating the right of access
to information into the right to freedom of speech in the academic world, most overseas human rights
jurisprudence has established that such a right is inherent and necessary for the full enjoyment of the right
to freedom of expression.”)
57. For a summary of the right to know in international human rights law, see Henry Perritt &
Christopher Lhulier, Information Access Rights Based on International Human Rights Law, 45 BUFF. L.
REV. 899 (1997).
58. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/universaldeclaration-human-rights/index.html( last visited Jan. 20, 2020).
59. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1976/03/19760323%2006-17%20AM/Ch_IV_04.pdf (last visited Jan.
20, 2020).
60. European
Convention
on
Human
Rights,
available
at
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf(last visited Jan. 20, 2020).
61. Angola, Armenia, Cape Verde, Republic of Congo, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Fiji, Finland, Germany, Guinea, Guinea Bissau,
Hungary, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Latvia , Liberia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico,
Mongolia, Pakistan, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam. The statistics of this paper based on
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have put freedom of speech and the right to know in adjacent articles,
demonstrating that the two may be closely interrelated.62 Ten other
countries have not put the two rights in one article or adjacent articles,
but in distinct places of the constitutions.63 This preliminary survey
shows that among the countries that recognized both freedom of
speech and the right to know as constitutional rights, most of them
realized that the latter is a constitutive part of the former, and that one
central component of freedom of speech is the control of information.
Constitutions that include both the
freedom of speech and the right to know

In the same article(43)
In adjacent articles(13)
In dispersive articles(10)

Among those constitutions which prescribe the two rights in one
clause, we can classify them into three groups. The first group uses
concise words to define the freedom of speech as including the right
to “acquire” or “receive” information. For example, Section 12 of
Finland’s Constitution states that “[e]veryone has the freedom of
expression. Freedom of expression entails the right to express,
disseminate and receive information, opinions and other
communications without prior prevention by anyone.”64 The second
group prescribes the two rights respectively in two paragraphs of the
same clause, with concise language. For example, the constitution of
Ukraine includes the freedom of speech and the right to know in the
first and second paragraph of Article 34.65 The third group also puts
the two rights in separate paragraphs, explains extensively the meaning
of them, and the scope of protection and the duty of government
departments. Such a detailed stipulation can be seen in the constitution
of Sweden—the first country in the world that constitutionalized the
CONSTITUTE PROJECT, https://www.constituteproject.org (last visited Apr. 26, 2019).
62. Albania, Bhutan, Belarus, Bolivia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ecuador,
Ghana, Morocco, Philippines, Romania, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.
63. Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Egypt, Georgia, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Montenegro, Panama, Paraguay,
Poland.
64. Finland
1999
(rev.
2011),
CONSTITUTE
PROJECT,
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Finland_2011 (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).
65. Ukraine
1996
(rev.
2016),
CONSTITUTE
PROJECT,
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ukraine_2016 (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).
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right to know.66
There are some national constitutions which only include the
freedom of speech without touching upon the right to know. The
United States is one typical case. The U.S. Supreme Court has
considered the approach of interpreting the right to know as part of the
free speech right, and recognized the important values served by the
right to know; but it has ultimately ruled that the constitution has not
granted a general and enforceable right to know.67 Part of the reason
is the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) by
Congress, which provides statutory protection of the right to know and
diminished the necessity of constitutional protection.68 FOIA has been
accepted as a remedy to the judicial refusal to recognize the right to
know.69 But we can also argue that, as the United States’ approach
shows, the development of the statutory right to know and the practice
of government information disclosure can sometimes thwart the
development of the freedom of speech, blocking its incorporation of
the right to know.
Other countries have taken a different approach than the United
States. Even though the right to know is not in their constitutional
texts, the courts in these countries have interpreted it as encompassed
by the freedom of speech. Japan, India, France, and South Korea are
typical cases of this type.70
Although a significant number of countries have recognized the
right to know as an essential part of the freedom of speech, either
through constitutional making, legislation, or judicial construction,
how to design the institutions and rules to implement the right remains
an issue underexplored. There are currently no agreements on the best
design, and maybe there will never be, since legal and cultural
backgrounds vary greatly among countries. To delve into the specific
choices of different countries and to evaluate these choices go beyond
the scope of this paper. My goal in the next Section is to examine the
issue of institutional design in the most general sense. I will classify

66. Sweden
1974
(rev.
2012),
CONSTITUTE
PROJECT,
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Sweden_2012 (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).
67. Laura Stein & Camaj Lindita, “Freedom of Information”, in OXFORD RESEARCH
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
COMMUNICATION, 1
May.
2019.
http://oxfordre.com/communication/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.001.0001/acrefore9780190228613-e-97; Sullivan, supra note 4, at 14-17.
68. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 17-18.
69. Schauer, supra note 42, at 39.
70. DAVID BANISAR, PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AROUND THE
WORLD 2006: A GLOBAL SURVEY OF ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION LAWS 17 (2006); KYU HO
YOUM ET.AL., Access to Government Information in South Korea: The Rise of Transparency as an Open
Society Principle, 7 J. INT'L MEDIA & ENT. L. 179, 190-91 (2017).
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the issue into several sub-categories and explore the normative
implications that the choice made in each sub-category will trigger.
Some of my proposed answers are tentative and should be read as
initiating, rather than ending, the debate.
B. Issues of Further Design

In constructing the freedom of speech as a right to know, there are
at least five issues of institutional design that need to be carefully
considered: (1) whether the right to know is conditional or
unconditional; (2) whether the content of the right to know is merely
institutional (i.e., mandating the establishment of institutions about
information disclosure and sharing), or generally enforceable in
ordinary lives of the general public; (3) whether the right to know is
negative or positive; (4) whether the scope of information for
disclosure is limited to public or general information; and (5) who can
claim such rights and have legal standing to challenge violations of
these rights.71
Questions 1 and 2 are relatively easy to answer. Even though there
are some who advocated an absolutist approach to the freedom of
speech, most have agreed that freedom is not without limits. Even the
absolutists, like Justice Black, have retreated from their position and
upheld some restrictions on free speech. The right to know is similarly
not without limits. It is conditional in the sense that, positively, it
should have a link with participation in public debates, and negatively,
it should not interfere inappropriately with the whole structure of
speech and the legitimate rights of others. As for question 2, the key
is whether it is practicable and sufficient for some institutions to
implement the right to know. Of course, we can set up some
institutions, such as an office inside the government to oversee and
conduct the obligation of information disclosure, without granting the
right of requesting information to individual citizens. But such
approach misses the central part of the normative underpinnings of the
right to know—to empower the individuals against public authorities
and to ensure their capabilities of democratic participation. Without
using it as a direct shield and sword, the right to know would lose much
of its force. Hence, the freedom of speech as a right to know is a
conditional and generally enforceable right that can be used in daily
lives.
Questions 3 and 4 can be discussed simultaneously, since the degree

71. Jeffrey J. Maciejewski & David T. Ozar, Natural Law and the Right to Know in a Democracy,
20 J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS, 121, 126-27 (2005).
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and scope of protection are interrelated. As for the degree, the weaker
case is the negative protection of non-interference—the government
cannot impose illegitimate prohibition or limitation on information
that has already been disclosed in the public sphere. The stronger case
is for the positive protection—the government (or other entities)
should disclose and provide (upon request or voluntarily) the
information to the marketplace.72 They correspond respectively to the
negative and positive notions of free speech. As for the scope, we can
also make a dichotomy. The narrow case is based on the narrowly
defined notion of democracy: it delimits the information disclosure
that is required by the right to know as those directly relevant to the
democratic participation, such as the information about the
administration of government agencies and the conduct of government
officials. This narrow concept of the democracy theory of free speech
was advocated by Bork. 73 The broad case, which is based on the
democracy theory advocated by Meiklejohn, 74 requires that all
information related to democratic governance, or all information that
has public importance,75 should be disclosed under the mandate of the
freedom of speech. For the narrow case, only the government is the
subject of duty. For the broad case, however, some corporations
(intermediaries) may also be required for disclosure—as long as the
information they possess concerns public interest.
We can combine the two dichotomies as follows:
Scope
Narrow
(government)
Broad
(government

Negative
(noninterference)
A

Degree

+

C

Positive
(duty of
disclosure)
B
D

72. Anthony Lewis, supra note 4, at 6-15 (1980) (describing the cases decided by the U.S. courts);
Sullivan, supra note 4, at 72 (summarizing three occasions of the right to know: the former two belong to
negative duties while the last one belongs to positive duties.)
73. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 35
(1971).
74. J. Skelly Wright, Defamation, Privacy, and the Public's Right to Know: A National Problem
and a New Approach, 46 TEX. L. REV. 630, 633 (1968); Meiklejohn, supra note 13.
75. Gotkin v. Miller, 379 F. Supp. 859, 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). To be sure, it is not easy to judge
whether a piece of information carries public importance or public interest. Media coverage is not a good
standard, since it will grant the media authority of determining whether the speech of their own is
protected, and the media tends to cover entertainment and sensational topics rather than serious ones. See
Wright, supra note 74, at 632; For a general account on how to distinguish public speech from private
speech, see Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections against
Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1000-1013 (2003).
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corporations)

Four possible approaches appear in the above table, marked as A,
B, C, and D. How should we choose? We can first exclude option A
as too restrictive: government’s duty of non-interference on the
information directly relevant to democracy is already covered by
current free speech jurisprudence. In fact, the negative liberty of
political speech is at the core of the First Amendment. The newly
formulated freedom will add nothing to the traditional one if we choose
A.
Option D is the most powerful one, as it mandates both the
government and corporations to disclose all information with public
importance. Although it empowers individuals, its drawbacks are also
obvious. First, a burdensome duty imposed on corporations will
threaten their autonomy as market entities. Unlike the intrinsic
individual autonomy that derives from the rationality of moral agents,
corporate autonomy gains its rationale instrumentally from the market
economy. Without sufficient autonomous space, market players will
not have the motivation and capacity to co-generate a prosperous and
ordered economy. Second, corporate intermediaries are not only
platforms, but also important participants in the public sphere. Their
participation, sometimes in the form of expressing a view directly and
sometimes in the form of exercising editorial discretion, is a vital
check on the power of the state. The requirement of disclosure of any
information with public importance would give the government a
trump card over the corporations. It may be abused to suppress some
corporations for preserving the entrenched interests of the government,
since “public importance” is a vague phrase and can easily be
manipulated. Therefore, even if it is plausible to make the Constitution
binding on the whole society, the duty of the government and the duty
of the private parties should be distinguished.76
What remains are Options B and C. Option B imposes a positive
duty on the government only, while Option C requires only a negative
duty of non-interference on both the government and corporate bodies.
However, we don’t have to choose between a narrow, strong protection
and a broad, weak protection. A combination of Options B and C is an
alternative. That is, the government is both negatively required not to
interfere and positively mandated to disclose public information, while
76. Balkin, supra note 30, at 2026 (“[I]t is generally a bad idea to hold social media spaces to the
same standards as municipal governments under the First Amendment. Imposing the same First
Amendment doctrines that apply to municipalities to social media companies would quickly make these
spaces far less valuable to end users, if not wholly ungovernable.”)
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corporations only have the negative duty of non-interference.
What the right to know covers is first and foremost the government
and its agencies. That is a corollary from the premises of the right:
popular sovereignty and democratic participation. It also conforms to
the modes of many countries’ constitutions. In the constitutional text
of countries like Armenia, Croatia, Cyprus, the Dominican Republic,
Finland, Guinea, Lithuania, and Sri Lanka, it is explicitly stated that
the right to know encompassed by the freedom of speech only touches
upon the government and public institutions. Commercial information
that is stored and processed by corporations is not within the scope of
disclosure required by the constitution. With respect to corporations,
the constitution only requires that they do not inhibit or distort the
information currently in flow in the public sphere. To be sure, ordinary
laws and regulations can prescribe some duties of disclosure for
corporations, especially under certain specialized areas such as
environmental protection, consumer protection and the securities. But
then it is statutory right, not a constitutional right to know that is
included in the freedom of speech.
It is evident that the combination of Option B and C is much less
radical than Option D. It treats separately the government and
corporations and assigns different degrees of duties to each of them.
One can reasonably argue that on the internet, where the regulatory
power of corporations seems to be no less than that of the government,
it is arbitrary to treat them differently. It is also true that sometimes the
information held by corporations is of great public importance and
vital to the exercise of democratic deliberation by citizens. That urges
us to rethink the plausibility of Option D and make a trade-off between
the autonomy interests of corporations and the danger of their immense
power.
There are two important caveats here. First, there is no power
vacuum. Either the state or the commercial entities, or something else,
will act as the leviathan, individually or jointly. The issue is not
whether we should trust the state or the market (corporations), because
neither should be trusted or distrusted unconditionally (since we have
no other choices). Maybe we will have to resort to the old Madisonian
idea of making them check one another. Although it may sound banal,
the key is to strike a balance. Second, since the key is in the balance—
and hence, the devil is in the details—we should be extremely cautious
about imposing the duty of disclosure on market bodies. Even if we
choose to adopt Option D, the scope and condition of disclosure by
corporations should be demarcated clearly by constitutional
interpretations (either through courts or through legislatures), to avoid
the risk of potential abuse caused by uncertainty.
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The last is question 5. The major difference between the
reformulated freedom of speech as the right to know and the traditional
freedom is that the new right entitles potential listeners – rather than
mere speakers—to a claimed right. But it should never be read as a
permission for every potential listener to request the disclosure of
every piece of information that she wants to know. This would be
formidable and impractical. Some threshold must be established. The
central issue of controversy is whether the standing of requesting
information should be limited to those with a direct interest in the
information. This issue has generated hot debate in China since the
regulation of government information disclosure enacted ten years
ago. Chun Peng, for example, argued that the right to know should not
be limited to the interested parties.77 By contrast, Xiaojian Qin has
insisted on maintaining the direct stake as a threshold, otherwise the
government disclosure to the public, which is based on the logic of
governance, would be confused with the government disclosure to the
legislature, which based on the logic of sovereignty.78 If we reinterpret
the right to know as part of the freedom of speech, the argument of
Chun Peng seems more convincing. As long as the information
requested is of public importance, it is a building block of the public
sphere, no matter whether the individual requesting that information is
directly interested. Here, the logic of governance inherent in
administrative law has been converted to the logic of sovereignty in
constitutional law, through the reformulated freedom of speech.
Information is not only vital for the government to sustain and improve
its administrative governance, but is also indispensable to the
formation of public opinion in the public sphere. It is a key element
of citizens’ democratic participation and deliberation. Without
information, people could not be sovereigns.
After we consider the issues of institutional design, we must also
bear in mind that the realization of the freedom of speech as a right to
know depends on the specific practices of constitutional
implementation in a country. In countries with judicial review,
citizens with legal standing can file constitutional lawsuits to request
the disclosure of information that falls within the scope prescribed by
the constitution. In countries where the constitution has been
implemented mainly through legislation, the legislatures should fulfill
their constitutional duty by enacting the relevant laws to prescribe the
concrete conditions and scope of the right to know.
77. CHUN PENG, The Constitutional Logic of China’s Government Information Disclosure, Wo
Guo Zheng Fu Xin Xi Gong Kai Zhi Du De Xian Fa Luo Ji, 2 FA XUE 94 (2019).
78. XIAOJIAN QIN, The Constitutional Logic of the Government Information Disclosure, Zheng Fu
Xin Xi Gong Kai De Xian Fa Luo Ji, 3 ZHONG GUO FA XUE 25 (2016).
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V. POSSIBLE CRITICISMS

The First potential criticism of the right to know is that to interpret
the freedom of speech as a right to know is to constitutionalize it. This
approach will change the statutory approach that was adopted in some
countries, like the United States and China. Because implementing the
new right is costly—at least in the sense that some institutions should
be set up and some staff should be hired responsible for disclosure, not
to mention the judicial costs incurred in managing new lawsuits—no
small portion of public resources will be spent realizing the right.
Some may argue that the redistribution of public resources is the task
of the political branch—the legislature, rather than the court.79 This
argument,
however,
confuses
constitutionalization
with
judicialization. Implementing the constitution is not only the duty of
the judiciary. The legislature can make detailed plans and procedures
in carrying out the duty of implementing the constitutional right to
know, and the court’s role is mainly to ensure that other branches have
not breached basic constitutional requirements. While the propriety of
judicial decisionmaking may be debated in information disclosure
cases, courts can choose not to be entangled with the specific and
highly specialized plans of public spending and administrative
management; rather, courts can guard the foundational tenets from
infringement.
It is important to differentiate between the constitutional right to
know, which has been incorporated into the freedom of speech under
my approach, and the statutory right to know, which might be
prescribed by ordinary legislations in fields such as health care,
consumer protection, and securities regulation. There might be some
overlap between the constitutional and the statutory right to know. If
the information covered by the statutory right to know carries public
importance that is directly related to the public debate and democratic
participation, it is also protected by the constitution. In other words,
the freedom of speech as a right to know is only a subset of the broader
notion of right to know.
Second, constitutionalization brings about issues of value judgment
and prior restraint. If we admit that the right to know is included within
the constitutional freedom of speech, we have to decide which
information should be known (and disclosed) and which should not.
In the process, it is inevitable to look at the content of the information,
and undisclosed information may never have a chance to be heard. We
may reasonably condemn that this constitutes prior restraint and value

79. Schauer, supra note 42, at 41.
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judgment, 80 and the decision we made is content-based, which is
highly problematic under the value neutrality principle of the freedom
of speech. It seems contradictory that an alleged stronger freedom of
speech contradicts with the basic spirit of free speech. But the prior
restraint here is not the same as the prior restraint we fear traditionally.
In the traditional scenario, there is a speaker who wants to express—
she has a desire to disclose certain information, and the regulator
predetermines the value and risk of that information and makes the
decision of prohibiting the disclosure. Here, the conflict of values lies
between freedom of speech on the one hand, and social welfare, such
as security and order, on the other. The central meaning of free speech
is that we cannot sacrifice it for more welfare, otherwise it would not
be different with a general sense of liberty: in other words, it is a
trump. 81 Free speech must enjoy priority and, in this sense, prior
restraint is impermissible. But in the scenario of the right to know, by
contrast, we have an unwilling speaker who does not wish to disclose
the information and a potential listener who requests the information
because of its public importance. Here, unlike the traditional scenario
of prior restraint, the conflict of values lies between freedom of speech
as a right to know and freedom of speech as a right not to know, or a
right to keep silent.82 When two rights of the same kind or two rights
in the same level of priority happen to clash, we cannot rule that one
of them automatically wins, but need to make a choice of balance in
concrete cases. Thus, in circumstances where we rule that some
information is not required to be disclosed, we ruled in favor of the
autonomous right of free speech of the information-bearer, rather than
suppress the autonomous right to speak of a willing speaker, like that
in the traditional scenario. So the judgment in the right to know case
is not the same prior restraint that we abhor.
As for the issue of value judgment, t is unavoidable in free speech
jurisprudence, even though sometimes we do not wish to admit it. An
absolute stance of value neutrality is not possible, 83 and maybe not
preferable either. The decision of which kinds of speech are protected
80. James C. Goodale, Legal Pitfalls in the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L. Q. 29, 32-34 (1976);
David M. O'Brien, Reassessing the First Amendment and the Public's Right to Know in Constitutional
Adjudication, 26 VILL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1981) (“First, the right to know inevitably leads to judicial
determinations of what the public does and does not have a right to know, and thus invites restrictions on
freedom of speech and press in the form of prior restraints. Moreover, judicial creation and construction
of the contours of a directly enforceable right to know usurp congressional power to determine the
wisdom, need, and propriety of public and press access to government information and facilities.”)
81. For the description of rights as trumps over general public interests and welfare, see RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Jamal Greene, Forward: Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV.
L. REV. 28 (2018).
82. It is obvious that the freedom of speech includes the freedom not to speak.
83. See LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? (2005).
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and which are not is a value judgment; the decision of which kinds of
speech receive a higher level of protection and which enjoy only
limited protection (for example, arguably, commercial speech,
pornography, and true threats) is a value judgment too. If we stick to
the creed of value neutrality unconditionally, the doctrine of free
speech will collapse. Actually, as scholars have pointed out, the idea
of neutrality itself is not neutral: it is a liberal value and embedded in
a particular tradition. 84 The argument of prior restraint and value
judgment should not, therefore, be sufficient to deny the freedom of
speech as a right to know. However, in practice, the judgment of which
information is required to be disclosed and who is entitled to request
disclosure can cause tremendous controversies. What we can do is
improve our institutional design. On the one hand, every value
judgment should conform to the constitutional values of democracy,
equality, and human dignity. On the other hand, the standard and
procedure of making judgments should be fair, transparent, and
reviewable.
Third, as previously illustrated, the right to know is listener-based,
and it tries to reconcile the listener’s interest with the speaker’s. Such
effort of reconciliation is not always easy. Here, I list some possible
scenarios of interest conflict that might appear in practice. In scenario
A, a potential listener or a group of potential listeners wants to hear,
but the information possessor does not want to speak and refuses to
disclose the information. This is the standard case. The test would be
to determine whether the information carries public importance and
whether the possessor is constitutionally obliged under the right to
know. Scenario B is a little more complicated. Sometimes one
potential listener wants to know a certain piece of information, while
another potential listener does not want the information to be
disclosed, or asserts that the disclosure is harmful to her.85 Moreover,
the possessor of the information may not manage to disclose it within
a limited scope or in a case-by-case manner (because, for example, it
will be too costly to do so). It is not rare that the government may
disclose some information that may be alleged by some individuals as
private or by some corporations as business secrets. Here, the right to
know of some potential listeners may clash with the autonomy rights
of other potential listeners.
Even more complicated is scenario C, where some potential
listeners do not want to know, but it might be beneficial for them to
know. In other words, involuntary exposure to some information is
84. See STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO,
102-138 (1994).
85. Kendrick, supra note 40, at 1798-1802.
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not always illegitimate.86 Such unwanted exposure may “force” the
citizens to hear and review different viewpoints, cultivating the virtue
of tolerance and the capacity of argumentation, which are salutary to
the democratic self-government.87 The problem is how to judge when
such exposure is necessary and not unduly oppressive? Who judges?
And how do we respond to the challenges of the encroachment of
autonomy and the risk of paternalism? These are thorny issues that
await further research. Some traditional debates might shed light on
these issues, one of which is the captive audience problem that has
been discussed under the public forum doctrine in the United States.88
Even though the doctrinal landscape there is also messy. Caroline
Corbin has identified “three prerequisites for a claim that mandated
listening enhances autonomy: the message must be factual, secular,
and autonomy-enhancing.” 89 However, the precise meaning of the
first two conditions are vague, and the reasoning of the last one is
circular.
A Fourth criticism is the tension between democracy and autonomy,
which can be observed in the three scenarios of the preceding two
paragraphs. The duty of disclosure raises a question of compelled
speech: the right to know of the listener clashes with the right to remain
silent of the unwilling speaker. What the previous analysis missed is
the tension between democracy and autonomy.90 The right to know
serves the value of democracy, while the compelled disclosure
(speech) threatens the value of autonomy. Limiting the subject of
disclosure to the government cannot solve this problem, because the
government keeps plenty of information on individual citizens.
Disclosing this information, which citizens do not necessarily want to
disclose, is another way of compelling them to speak—the government
here plays the role of a mouthpiece.
The argument from autonomy alone cannot be a sufficient argument
for refuting a law, since “[l]aws generally limit autonomy, at least in
the sense that they prevent people from doing what they would
otherwise choose to do.” 91 In some sense, law can be defined as
necessary compromises of autonomy for the sake of public life.
Second, freedom of speech is itself a complex idea, full of tensions,
86. Scanlon, supra note 54, at 524.
87. Sunstein, supra note 33.
88. For a general account, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974
SUP. CT. REV. 233 (1974).
89. Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 939, 992 (2009).
90. Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First
Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1644 (1995).
91. Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147, 151 (2006).
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contradictions, and ironies. On the one hand, freedom of speech
entails a right to know: more speech and more information is
encouraged, for the value of democracy. On the other hand, freedom
of speech entails the right not to speak, which results in less speech
and less information, and serves the value of autonomy and privacy.
Whether it is more desirable to have a world with more speech or less
speech, or, put another way, whether people should be encouraged to
go back to the private sphere and become individuals, or it is better for
them to go out to the public sphere and become citizens, is not a simple
question that calls for a definite answer. This is a judgment that we
should make in concrete contexts, bearing all the values and
contingencies in mind. To be sure, the freedom of speech as a right to
know cannot provide us a definite answer here. It is a fundamental
right that serves multiple values, and it may give way to other values
in concrete cases. The inevitable conflict of values is not a reason to
deny a right that entails such conflict. In addition, we may be
comforted by the fact that what the right to know requires of the
government and corporations is the disclosure of factual information,
rather than opinions. Compared to opinions, facts contain less
autonomy values. The compelled disclosure of facts has a limited harm
on autonomy because it will not change or suppress the beliefs of
individuals, and the danger of the distortion effect is much lower.92
Fifth, as the common normative basis of and the link between
freedom of speech and right to know, democracy is itself a
controversial notion. 93 What is democracy? What does democracy
require? What does democracy disdain? These are questions with no
definite answers. The democratic values of freedom of speech can be
used by opposing parties in a dispute due to the uncertainty, flexibility,
and manipulability of the idea of democracy. 94 For example, in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, those who support
the regulations on campaign finance and those who oppose both
ground their positions in a different understanding of democracy. 95
With regard to the topic of this Article, some may argue that the basis
of freedom of speech and right to know is deliberative democracy or a
republican version of democracy. This version may be incompatible
92. Caroline M. Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1291-98 (2014).
93. See Frances H. Foster, Information and the Problem of Democracy: The Russian Experience,
44 AM. J. COMP. L. 243, 277 (1996) (“Tying constitutional rights to ‘democracy’ would be problematic in
any context. It requires some shared understanding of the term ‘democracy’ to ensure stable and consistent
definition and application of constitutional guarantees. Yet, as a vast literature has demonstrated, there is
little consensus worldwide on what constitutes ‘democracy.’”)
94. See David A. J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy, the Principle of Free Speech, and the
Politics of Identity, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 779 (1999).
95. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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with the representative democracy in the modern world.96 The reason
is, compared to the republican democracy where citizens participate in
the decision-making of public affairs in a positive and normal basis,
representative democracy organizes periodical elections to make the
government responsible. With respect to the details of the governance
and daily public affairs, the individual citizens are not required or even
not encouraged to get involved.97 In modern times, the general public
does not have the leisure to participate in politics, and it may not be an
affordable job for them, since politics nowadays is a highly specialized
profession requiring special training. A deliberative and republican
version of democracy, though appealing at first look, does not fit into
reality. After all, the ideal type of Meiklejohn’s democracy theory is
the town meetings in pre-modern America, 98 not the parliament of
modern states.
This argument is not without merit. The right to know aims to
facilitate deliberation and discussion in the public sphere. But the
republican version (deliberation) and the representative version of
democracy (voting) are not incompatible. Rather, they are mutually
supplementary and mutually supportive. Without a robust freedom of
speech and a right to know about the information of what and how our
representatives have done, we cannot make a fully rational choice in
casting our vote. That is Meiklejohn’s argument. What’s more, the
right to know is an important check on the government (and other
entities that carry out public functions). Even though people are
economic rather than political animals in modern times, they should
be left with an option of participating in politics—when they want.
While this might not always be the case, they must be entitled to that
option. The question is not what will citizens actually do, but whether
they have such a choice, or capability, to decide what to do. In
addition, participation is far broader than dealing with affairs
concerning the government. Politics is another word of public life, and
there are many institutions that constitute our public life—schools,
workplaces, churches, and civil associations of all kinds. Participation
and deliberation in these spaces also contribute to the formation of the
public opinion and the construction of the public sphere.99 So the idea
96. See Louis Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon
Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 273 (1971)；Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press:
The Search for a Constitutional Principle, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 482, 503-06 (1980)；Edward H. Levi,
Confidentiality and Democratic Government, 30 REC. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 323, 326 (1975).
97. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 59.
98. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE, 24-26 (1965); see also Patrick Birkinshaw, Freedom of Information and Openness: Fundamental
Human Rights, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 177, 191 (2006).
99. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Accommodating Linguistic Difference: Toward a Comprehensive
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that the only way for citizens in modern democracies to participate in
politics is voting seems to be too narrow, for it ignores the plurality of
the public sphere. In this sense, the freedom of speech as a right to
know, by facilitating the participation and deliberation through various
channels, supplements and supports the representative democracy—it
does not contradict with our idea and practice of democracy, but
actually enlivens it.
VI. CONCLUSION

In the landmark case New York Times v. Sullivan, Justice Brennan
famously remarked that “debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open” 100 . Arguably, “uninhibited” refers to noninterference by government (and commercial entities) and “wide-open”
can be achieved by guaranteeing access to channels of expression.
These two elements have been surveyed extensively by commentators.
However, the objective of the public debate being “robust” remains
elusive and underexplored. To delve into it deeply requires a thorough
examination of the normative values of free speech, which goes
beyond the scope of this Article. What this Article contributes to the
literature is that by highlighting the central importance of information,
a fuller picture of free speech, as a normative tenet of modern
constitutionalism, would emerge. Information serves as both the
epistemic and democratic foundations of free speech: without the
acquisition, possession, and processing of information, collective
pursuit of knowledge and participatory deliberation of public policy
would not be possible. To know is logically and practically anterior to
discussion, debate, and deliberation. In this sense, freedom of speech
can be reformulated as right to know, since it encompasses and also
enlarges the meaning of the former. Freedom of speech as a right to
know also carries important practical implications: it strikes a better
balance between speakers and listeners, underscores the positive side
of the freedom, and offers new perspectives in approaching the issues
of professional speech and commercial speech. To fully actualize the
freedom of speech as a right to know, both theoretical and doctrinal
elaborations are needed. In particular, issues of institutional design,
such as the scope, strength, and content of this “new” right, should be
elaborated. Discussions of them, though, shall await another occasion
Theory of Language Rights in the United States, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 135 (2001) (“Rather
than thinking of political community in terms of a national conversation, we should understand it as a set
of diversified and diffuse interactions that can occur in communities of all kinds through a variety of
media.”)
100
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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of future research.
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